Delinquency and the Question of Values
John Braithwaite and Sutherland and Cressey (1966: 82) (1969) and Barron (1974) Braithwaite, 1979) . Nevertheless, researchers such as Mizruchi (1967) Box (1971: 107-108) , also suggests that there is no &dquo;reaction formation&dquo; because the lower class boys do not internalise the status criteria of the school in the first place; it is simply that the boys &dquo;can't be indifferent to&dquo; the status criteria of the school.
Conventional Proscriptive Values
The Downes dissociation hypothesis is one example of a number of theories which focus upon failure in a status system causing a weakening of commitment to the conventional prescriptive values of that status system. Hirschi's (1969: 26) Figure 1 ). There are theories which explain delinquency by delinquent prescriptive values (Miller, Cohen) , by conventional prescriptive values (Schur, Barron) , by reaction against conventional prescriptive values (Cohen) , by the blockage of access to conventional prescriptive values (Merton) , and by &dquo;dissociation&dquo;, &dquo;anomie&dquo; and &dquo;drift&dquo; from conventional proscriptive values (Downes, Hirschi, Matza) . The Deitz (1972) also found minimal value differences between delinquents and non-delinquents, and these differences were unrelated to the weak class differences in values which emerged from the study.
Cernkovich (1978) Heather (1979) .
Using a semantic differential, Siegal, Rathus and Ruppert (1973) found that in a delinquent subculture many middle-class conventional values were still upheld; but that delinquents had somewhat less positive attitudes than non-delinquents to &dquo;police&dquo;, &dquo;law&dquo;, &dquo;saving money&dquo;, and &dquo;education&dquo;; and more positive attitudes to &dquo;crime&dquo; and &dquo;work&dquo;. Similarly Chapman (1966) found that the &dquo;person who is in trouble with the law&dquo; was more positively evaluated by delinquents than by non-delinquents, and Stafford (1979) found that delinquents were more likely to argue that &dquo;it's okay to break the law if you can get away with it&dquo;.
In two studies in which Hindelang (1969, 1974) Hackler (1970) and Liska (1973) have used path analysis to try to resolve this dilemma, but results from both were equivocal. In a totally different approach to the problem, Heather (1979) Considering all of the foregoing, the hypothesis that in one way or another delinquents have a greater capacity for tolerance of delinquent behaviour does enjoy a fair deal of empirical support. However, it is not possible to move from this to the common assertion that lower class people have attitudes more tolerant of delinquency, hence the higher delinquency rates evident among the lower class.
The fact is that such little evidence as we have is not consistent with the latter proposition. Hackler (1970) found that low socio-economic status boys were not more inclined to endorse delinquent behaviour than boys of higher socio economic status. More surprisingly, Faust (1970) (Kvaraceus, 1945; Toby and Toby, 1957; Gold, 1963: 44; Lunden, 1964; Polk, 1965; Polk and Halferty, 1966; Schafer and Polk, 1967; Rhodes and Reiss, 1969; Fisher, 1970; Lanphier and Faulkner, 1970; Burns, 1971; Empey et al., 1971; Kelly, 1971; Kelly and Balch, 1971; Farrington, 1973; Frease, 1973; Gold and Mann, 1973; Mugishima and Matsumoto, 1973; Phillips, 1974; Offord et al., 1978) . Moreover, contrary to the conclusions of many selective reviews and introductory textbooks, when all the existing empirical evidence is pulled together, it does sustain the conclusion that low socio-economic status is also a correlate of delinquency (Braithwaite, 1981; cf. Tittle et al., 1978 ). This conclusion is not consistently supported, particularly by selfreport studies. Yet even with self-reports, more studies show significant class differences than would be expected on the basis of chance. Furthermore, while there is a considerable literature which has failed to demonstrate consistent or important class biases in official records of delinquency (see, for example, the review by Liska and Tausig, 1979) , there is a neglected literature which suggests that the self-report methodology may exaggerate the proportion of delinquency perpetrated by the middle class (Braithwaite, 1979 (Stinchcombe, 1964; Stark, 1979) . Hirschi (1972) (Stinchcombe, 1964; Kelly, 1971; Kelly and Balch, 1971; Frease, 1973; Polk et al,. 1974 ) have even supported the conclusion that middle class children who fail at school engage in more delinquent behaviour than lower class school failures. Polk (1969) , however, found that academically unsuccessful lower class boys were just as delinquent as academically unsuccessful middle class boys.
What we are suggesting is that failure in a status system leads to delinquency and that this relationship may be mediated by changes in beliefs and value commitments which will vary greatly between cultures and between individuals. Moreover, an understanding of this diversity of value changes has proven to be of limited use in advancing our understanding of delinquency even within any one culture.
Let us illustrate this argument with a key example. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) hypothesised that failure in a status system will only cause delinquency where there is an &dquo;attribution of the cause of failure to the social order rather than to oneself, for the way in which a person explains his failure largely determines what he will do about it&dquo;. Belief that one is the victim of an unjust system will result in alienation from that system, and withdrawal of attributions of legitimacy from official norms. Belief that failure is the result of one's personal deficiency results in pressures to improve oneself, and leaves the legitimacy of established norms intact. The empirical evidence is conflicting and inconclusive on whether delinquents are more likely to blame the system or their personal inadequacy for their predicament (Gold, 1963: 159-160; Rosenberg and Silverstein, 1969: 130-33; Quicker, 1973; Elliott and Voss, 1974: 30-31; Picou et al., 1974) . Contrary to Cloward and Ohlin, it is reasonable to hypothesise that if one fails in a system, one will withdraw attributions of legitimacy to that system, ir-respective of the perceived reasons for failure.
It is the failure itself which is predictively more dependable and it is levels of failure, rather than the supposedly associated value changes, which are directly manipulable by educational and economic policies. The search for delinquent values should join the search for somatotypes and personality defects as another unfruitful historically protracted attempt to locate (by circular logic) the cause of delinquency within the delinquent himself.
